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Abstract 
This article examines William Baumol’s theory about the interaction between taxation and 
entrepreneurship and proposes an extension to it. The analysis shows that the traditional form 
of Baumol’s model, focusing mainly on the level of taxes, cannot be used in order to explain 
what happened in the Greek case. Utilising historical evidence from the mid-1950s to the 
late-1980s, this paper confirms that problematic tax rules create difficulties for 
entrepreneurship and can lead to unproductive forms of it, as Baumol suggests. However, the 
focus here is on aspects of the system of taxation that Baumol’s model, examining solely tax 
rates and levels of taxation, neglected. It is shown that, as far as Greek entrepreneurship is 
concerned, the adverse effects of the system of taxation came not from the level of taxes, but 
mostly from a series of issues that increased its perceived unfairness and illegitimacy. Some 
of such issues were the complexity and frequent change of legislation, the insufficient 
organisation of the tax bureaus as well as the lack of adequate training and arbitrariness of the 
members of tax services. The evidence presented here suggests that Baumol’s model can be 
enriched by taking into consideration these aspects of taxation too. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, William Baumol, Institutions, Tax System, Greece 
 
Introduction – An opportunity to examine Baumol’s theory 
 
In his famous 1990 article on productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship, 
William Baumol argued that the rules of the game in an economy, such as for example tax 
rules, create incentives that influence entrepreneurship in different ways and allocate it 
between either productive activities (e.g. innovation), or unproductive activities, such as rent 
seeking and organised crime. As he wrote, ‘[h]ow the entrepreneur acts at a given time and 
place depends heavily on the rules of the game -the reward structure in the economy- that 
happen to prevail.’1  
Referring also to Assar Lindbeck’s work, who demonstrated that in high-tax environments 
entrepreneurs channel their efforts to unproductive entrepreneurship such as financial 
speculation or even illegal activities,2 Baumol noted that ‘taxes can serve to redirect 
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entrepreneurial effort’.3  Generally, when writing about ‘taxes’ or ‘tax rules’ in his 1990 
article, Baumol referred to the level of taxation.4 The same holds for his subsequent works.5  
This article suggests that Baumol’s focus on the level of taxes would be too narrow to 
examine the emergence of unproductive entrepreneurship in Greece. The evidence presented 
here suggests that the obstacles that the tax system created for Greek entrepreneurship came 
from the way it functioned, not the level of taxes. This seems to be the case from the various 
complaints expressed and the communications issued by entrepreneurs and their 
representative bodies, but also through an examination of relevant macroeconomic data. For 
example, entrepreneurs’ total tax burden had had a significant long-term decline throughout 
the period of analysis. Specifically, the data that Tatsos presents, concerning the total tax 
burden distribution throughout the period 1960-1998, indicate that in 1960 entrepreneurs bore 
50.9% of the total tax burden, a rate that was reduced to 41.2% in 1970, 29.8% in 1980, 
25.3% in 1990 and 22.8% in 1998.6 Also, in Greece, the share of taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (but also that of total tax revenue) over GDP was significantly lower than the 
OECD average.7 Moreover, after the mid 1970s, it was not entrepreneurs who bore the 
majority of the tax burden in Greece, but salaried employees.8 It is equally important to note 
that the Greek tax system has traditionally been based upon indirect taxes. This has been 
attributed to a number of reasons, such as for example the incapability of the tax auditors to 
capture the tax accruing from business income and the income of the wealthier classes. This 
again indicates that the main disincentive the tax system posed for Greek entrepreneurs was 
not the level of taxes they paid, as the traditional form of Baumol’s model would suggest, 
however much they might complain about this. 
The evidence presented in this paper shows that it was the way that the tax system functioned 
that was posing a systemic threat to Greek entrepreneurs’ activities. There were complaints 
and criticism about the functioning of the tax system and its effect on business throughout the 
period under examination. However, the impact of such problems was less explicit during the 
years of rapid economic growth, that is, from the mid-1950s up to about the mid-1970s. From 
this point onwards, there was a deterioration in the economy that made such problems 
significantly more pressing.  
Indicatively, in April 1975, in his report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, Xenophon 
Zolotas wrote that the Greek economy was ‘in a particularly precarious state, being 
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characterised by recession, a high rate of inflation and a serious deficit in the balance of 
payments’.9 The economic downturn gradually intensified, getting the form of stagflation, 
increasing deficits and deteriorating competitiveness.10 In this context, 1980 marked the 
beginning of a period characterised by low growth rates and deterioration in all the indicators 
of the degree of dynamism in the economy, and especially that of the percentage of 
investment to GDP.11 Also, according to Bank of Greece data, from 1985 to 1990 the growth 
rate of GDP got significantly reduced from 3.39% to -0.35%.12 Public deficit and debt as a 
percentage of GDP were also increased throughout the decade, from -2.6% and 28.6% in 
1980 to -14.4% and 69.9% in 1989, respectively.13 Such negative developments were 
accompanied by an exacerbation of the problems in the way the tax system functioned, 
primarily because of the increase in the complexity and the frequency of change of tax 
legislation, as will be shown in the next pages. In this framework, the problems caused by the 
tax system gradually became more explicit. 
This paper suggests that the explanatory power of Baumol’s model can be enhanced by 
taking into consideration the importance of the tax regime as well, and examining how the 
way that the tax services function affect entrepreneurship.   
In fact, Greece is not unique when it comes to this matter, as the problems of tax 
administration are currently a topical issue in a number of European states. This is indicated 
through the European Commission’s 2014 Competitiveness Report, which contained the 
results of a survey exploring the dimensions of public administration that most impede firms’ 
operations across a number of European countries.14 The finding of the survey was that the 
most severe obstacles to firm growth are tax administration (not tax rates), corruption and 
ineffective justice systems.15 In other words, tax administration is perceived as a common 
problem in many European states. Due to this reason, the implications of the examination 
done here can prove useful not only for Greece but for these countries too.  
In terms of the distinctions of the uses of history proposed by Kipping and Üsdiken, this 
research follows the approach of historical cognisance. This is because the analysis is driven 
by a ‘history to theory’ perspective, by examining the validity of a theoretical model, being 
however, at the same time, heavily contextualised.16  
Baumol’s contributions on institutions and entrepreneurship 
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William Baumol is considered to have pioneered the importance of institutions for 
entrepreneurship,17 maintaining that a reallocation of entrepreneurial efforts towards 
productive activities can be achieved through a change in the ‘rules of the game’, that is, in 
the way that institutions function in a society.18  
Baumol’s work is set within the wider framework of research suggesting that cross-country 
differences in long-term economic performance can be seen as the result of differences in 
these countries’ institutional set up. Works such as that of North and Acemoglu and Robinson 
are prominent examples of such strand of literature.19 Of course, Baumol’s contribution was 
focused specifically on entrepreneurship.20 Using examples from history, he showed that the 
relative payoffs that society attributes to each kind of activity, that is, the ‘reward structure’ 
of society, is what determines the allocation of entrepreneurship into various activities.21 In 
more detail, he maintained that Schumpeter’s list regarding what could be considered as 
innovation in an economy (that is, technological improvement, a new good, a new method of 
production, an opening of a new market, a new source of supply of raw materials or the 
emergence of ‘the new organization of any industry’)22 should be extended so as to include 
‘items such as innovation in rent seeking procedures’.23 In such a case, entrepreneurship can 
be unproductive, or even destructive.  
The decisive factor determining whether entrepreneurship will focus on productive or 
unproductive activities is the set of institutions influencing the relative payoffs attributed to 
different entrepreneurial activities. As Baumol wrote in a subsequent article, ‘when the 
supply of productive entrepreneurs declines this is likely to be attributable not to an 
autonomous contraction in the total number of innovating entrepreneurs, but to a change in 
the structure of rewards that has led entrepreneurs to transfer their innovative talents from 
production to rent seeking or worse’.24 
Therefore, according to Baumol, the term ‘unproductive entrepreneurship’ encompasses a 
large spectrum of activities: rent seeking through takeovers, litigation, tax avoidance and 
even tax evasion schemes are all unproductive activities, having an entrepreneurial character 
though, given the possible rewards yielded and the effort exerted by business executives to 
pursue them.25  
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In later works, Baumol proposed further distinctions of entrepreneurship. For example, in 
1994 he referred to innovative, imitative, unproductive and rent-seeking entrepreneurship, but 
also to entrepreneurship as business founding and management.26 In 2007 he wrote of 
innovative and replicative entrepreneurs,27 and in 2010 of redistributive and productive 
ones.28  
 
The effect of taxation on entrepreneurship 
It should he noted here that a large part of the literature examining how taxes affect 
entrepreneurship does not make any clear distinction between various aspects of taxation. For 
this literature, the functioning of the tax system is either not discussed at all or considered as 
one of the many components of ‘taxation’ – but there is no special focus on how it affects 
business. An example of such literature is the work of  Robin Douhan and Magnus 
Henrekson. They note that when the cost of abiding by tax regulations increases, tax evasion 
increases too, but also that when the level of taxes increase, entrepreneurs are channeling 
their efforts towards unproductive forms of entrepreneurship, such as tax avoidance.29 
Similarly, Henrekson notes that the effects of taxes on entrepreneurial behaviour are complex 
because of the ‘complexity of the tax code’.30 However, his main interest is in examining the 
effects of tax rates on business activity and entrepreneurial behaviour, arguing that ‘high 
taxes may spur self-employment but reduce productive entrepreneurship’.31 
The absence of any special focus on the functioning of the tax administration also holds for a 
significant part of the literature that has utilised Baumol’s model in order to examine the 
effect of taxation on entrepreneurship. Here, again, the main interest is on the level of taxes. 
An example of such literature is the work of Larroulet and Couyoumdjian, which investigates 
the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth in Latin America.  Focusing 
on the institutional factors that Baumol’s model examines, they too referred to taxation in 
terms of the extent of the tax burden.32 Similarly, in their examination of the institutional tax 
setup in Sweden, Edmark and Gordon showed that the level of tax rates affects companies’ 
organisational form in the country.33  
Again, the purpose here is not to claim that the role and importance of tax administration has 
been totally disregarded by the literature. A work that refers to the functioning of the tax 
system as well is that of Russell Sobel, who tested the validity of Baumol’s model using an 
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econometric perspective. Sobel also mainly focused on tax rates, however, when suggesting 
institutional reforms that would support productive entrepreneurship, apart from a reduction 
of the level of taxation, he also proposed the simplification of tax codes. This could be done, 
as he noted, in order to ‘reduce the ability of groups to lobby for specific exemptions, credits, 
and rate reductions.’34 A similar perspective is followed by Coyne and Leeson, on their 
analysis of the Romanian case. Identifying tax evasion as evasive entrepreneurship, the 
authors argued that it is to a great extent an outcome of the ‘oblique and rapidly changing 
Romanian tax code’.35 Also, they noted that according to the 2003-2004 Global 
Competitiveness Report, Romanian entrepreneurs found tax regulations to be the most 
serious obstacle for doing business in the country.36 What makes the present study different 
from such works is the fact that, here, the functioning of the tax administration is not just one 
of the factors of interest, but the main focus of it. Of course, a further distinguishing 
characteristic is that the analysis done here is a historical one, with the use of relevant data. 
As will be discussed next, Baumol’s model seems to be ideal for historical analyses of 
entrepreneurship. 
Baumol in historical studies 
That Baumol’s model fits very well with the use of historical perspectives when examining 
entrepreneurship has been noted by Geoffrey Jones and Dan Wadhwani. They stressed that 
his work ‘provides an excellent illustration of how a critical understanding of historical 
context and variation can help create useful and robust generalizations that are nevertheless 
bounded by time’.37 In general, as the authors note, entrepreneurial processes are embedded 
in certain institutional and historical settings,38 therefore ‘many of the most interesting and 
intriguing research questions about entrepreneurship beg for institutionalist methodologies’.39  
The great scope for business history research to engage with Baumol’s theory has also been 
highlighted by Walter Friedman and Geoffrey Jones, who, in an article in the Business 
History Review stressed the need to test his theories -  specifically, his distinction between 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship - from the perspective of historical 
experience.40 However, the majority of business and economic history literature that has 
referred to Baumol has just used his ideas, rather than attempting to explore their validity.41 
An exception to this tendency has been the work of Ortiz-Villajos and Sotoka, who examined 
the determinants of entrepreneurial success in 20th century Spain.42 The authors referred to 
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Baumol’s expanded list of what constitutes innovation in Schumpeterian terms and confirmed 
his position about the importance of the institutional environment for entrepreneurship.43 
However, their analysis considered the institutional environment as a whole, without having 
any special interest on the system of taxation per se. This is what the contribution of the 
present paper will be, by focusing on the case of post-Second World War Greece and 
exploring the interaction between the system of tax administration and entrepreneurship in 
the country. 
 
Greek tax system and entrepreneurship, 1950s-1980s 
When the independent Greek state was established right after the end of the Second World 
War, the tax system’s primary scope was to collect revenues, without having any significant 
redistributive and social dimensions. As Giouras and Psalidopoulos’ work indicates, this was 
also the character of tax policies followed by the German occupation forces during the war.44 
Due to this reason, people saw the tax system mostly as a mechanism that ‘drained’ money 
away from their pockets and this naturally made them eager to avoid paying taxes. To this 
also contributed the fact that the distribution of the tax burden was considered unfair, 
because, among others, as Tatsos notes, the burden for the lower income brackets was 
significantly higher than that of the higher ones.45 Perceptions about the unequal distribution 
of the tax burden in Greece contributed to the problem of tax evasion, which, as a relevant 
study by Kalyvianakis et al. suggests,46 started growing significantly from the late 1970s, 
contributing, in turn, to a continuously growing public deficit.  
Another characteristic of the tax system that made it unfair by contributing to the unequal 
distribution of the tax burden, thus also increasing incentives for tax evasion, was the 
preferential tax regime of the farmers. As Dertilis mentions, the legislative order 3323/1955 
that concerned individual income taxation established a ‘very high tax-free threshold, which 
virtually exempted agricultural income from any kind of taxation.47’ Overall, until the decade 
of the 1990s, the participation of agricultural income in the state’s total tax revenues 
amounted to less than 1 per cent until the decade of the 1990s (ibid).48 
Also, there was a series of tax rebates that provided significant tax relief for the higher 
income classes and small or no relief for the medium and lower ones.49 Throughout the 
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period 1960-1998 the per capita tax exemptions and rebates given to the financially stronger 
classes of industrialists, traders and freelance professionals increased much more rapidly than 
those given to other classes, such as pensioners and salaried employees.50   
This again indicates that the main disincentive the tax system posed for Greek entrepreneurs 
was not the level of taxes they paid, as the traditional form of Baumol’s model would 
suggest. Specifically, in the report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece for 1980, it was 
mentioned that for the promotion of investment in the country there should be a re-
examination of a series of disincentives that had the form of state regulations and 
‘interventions in the economic life’. Such disincentives, stressed the Governor Xenophon 
Zolotas, created obstacles ‘to the smooth function of the market [and] the rational allocation 
of resources’, but also ‘neutralis[ed] and render[ed] ineffective any developmental incentives 
and inhibit[ed] the assumption of business initiative...’51 In about the same time the Bank of 
Greece produced a study that analysed such disincentives, burdening predominantly the 
industrial sector.52 The study was conducted by the so-called Disincentives Committee, 
presided by Zolotas, with the participation of the ‘productive classes’, which had been called 
upon to ‘point out...the circumstances or law provisions that created obstacles or confusion 
and had halting effects on entrepreneurial activities’.53 One hundred and three professional 
bodies and individual companies participated in the initiative, among which were the 
Federation of Greek Industrialists, the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 
various other Chambers of the country, as well as the Union of Corporations and Limited 
Liability Companies.54 According to the study, there were disincentives relating to exports, 
disincentives relating to production and investment, financial disincentives, but also tax and 
fiscal disincentives. There were 13 different types of disincentives belonging to this last 
category, 7 of which related to the problematic functioning of the tax administration. These 7 
types of disincentives had to do with a) the fact that tax audits were not taking place with the 
same standards every year, b) the fact that tax audits were very often delayed and as a result 
tax payers were not informed in time about their tax obligations,  c) issues concerning the 
functioning of the tax justice and the fact that there was not any code of legislation 
concerning the adjudicating of tax cases, d) the fact that errors and omissions in tax books 
were often treated as cases of wilful concealment of income and thus punished accordingly, 
e) delays in the reimbursement of customs duties and other taxes, f) issues such as the fact 
that some taxes were levied on a retroactive basis and the fact that tax penalties were not 
lifted in cases were certain errors in tax books were due to false guidance given by the tax 
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authorities themselves and g) issues such as the continuous changes and the complexity and 
lack of clarity of the tax laws.55  
 
Complexity of legislation 
  
The complexity, obscurity and continuous changes of the tax legislation were major issues 
burdening the Greek tax system throughout the period examined in this paper. According to 
the proceedings of the first national accounting congress in 1957, tax justice in the country 
functioned under a ‘labyrinthine’ regime.56 This problem of high complexity related, it was 
noted, to the unsuitability and incompetence of the bodies responsible for handling tax 
disputes.57 Similarly, in his speech in the second congress of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry of Greece, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Thessaloniki 
referred to an OEEC58 report for Greece which mentioned that ‘[t]here is no hope that firms 
will reach the apex of their efficiency...with no clear, specified and effective dissemination of 
information. In Greece many factors oppose this. The most important one is the State’s strict 
and detailed inspection of the accounting books of firms, which forces industry to engage in 
dull paperwork, which is not met in...industrially advanced countries’.59 
Similarly, in a meeting with the minister of Economics in 1965, the president of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry of Piraeus, Nikos Svoronos,60 noted that ‘sometimes, the 
procedures and prerequisites for some pieces of legislation are so complex that the 
entrepreneur waives his right to use them, resulting in a non-fulfillment of the scope of the 
legislation’.61 In the same vein, it was mentioned in an August 1970 issue of the Bulletin of 
the FGI that according to a tax expert, ‘having three tax officers separately auditing the 
accounting books of a large company and making the same assessment for the level of its 
[taxable] income, would be a random coincidence, under the current tax regime.’62 The law 
185 against tax law offences that had been introduced in 1967, that is, when Greece was ruled 
by a dictatorship, was criticised for precisely the same reason. It was stressed that the law 
needed to change, because some parts of it were ‘clear disincentives for private 
entrepreneurial initiative.’63 The law set the procedures of criminal prosecution against those 
who were accused of having broken ‘paragraph 4 of the 5th article of the Tax Code and article 
3 of the legislative order 3848/1958’ by affecting the validity of accounting books. In its 
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initial form, the law, entitled ‘On the imposition of penal sanctions against tax law offenders’ 
stated that owners or managers of Greek companies and managers or representatives of 
foreign companies based in Greece being accused of such acts would be called before 
emergency military courts.64  The law continued to operate after the fall of the dictatorial 
regime in spite of the fact that it was often criticised of being a ‘sword of Damocles’ that 
‘unexpectedly criminalised the country’s economic life, being introduced without the 
prior...establishment of modern Economic Laws, and being based mostly on the excessive 
formalism [and] improvisation of the Tax Code’.65 
In roughly the same period, in the sixth Congress of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of Greece it was mentioned that ‘the frequent changes of the tax legislation and other surprise 
alterations and contradictory policies’ were serious disincentives for the country’s economic 
development.66 Entrepreneurs that were interviewed for this research and who have been 
active in the Greek industry since the late 1970s supported the same view. One of them, 
Stelios Argyros,67 noted the following: 
I do not think that it could be argued that companies in Greece were ever overtaxed, 
because there has been a series of measures that reduced the tax burden, such as tax 
incentives...on the other hand, companies in Greece were never taxed in a stable 
manner. They never had even a five years horizon so as to know on the basis of which 
tax policies they should program their commercial and industrial plans. This is an 
obstacle for good entrepreneurship. For bad entrepreneurship, it is not an obstacle, 
because people involved in it consider the non-payment of taxes to be an obligation, 
even in a low-tax environment.68 
Apart from showing that the constant changes in the tax law framework were unsettling 
for business, this view elucidates Baumol’s idea about forms of ‘unproductive 
entrepreneurship’69 – in this case, entrepreneurship that focuses mainly on evading 
taxation-  that arise in environments in which institutions such as the system of taxation 
do not function properly.  
In the same vein, the annual activity report for 1979 of the Union of Corporations and 
Limited Liability Companies mentioned that for the advancement of private investment, 
political, economic and financial stability, but also tax stability and consistency were needed. 
However, it stressed that such conditions were not met in the case of Greece and that the tax 
system was anything but stable: there were only ‘continuous changes’ in it, which, combined 
with the various special contributions and other taxes, created a picture of ‘striking tax 
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instability, prohibitive of investment activities’.70  It was also mentioned in the press that in a 
period of ‘desperate efforts’ for the promotion of investment, ‘sudden’ tax measures, 
increased the uncertainty of the ‘business owner-investor’(I Kathimerini, January 21, 1979). 
It must be noted here that, as mentioned in the beginning of this article, the problem of the 
complexity of tax legislation seemed to start becoming a more pressing issue from the mid-
1970s onwards. The reasons for this are manifold. First of all, it is important to note that 
Greece experienced a seven year military dictatorship period from 1967 to 1974.  During 
these years the situation in the tax services worsened, because there were a large number of 
dismissals of civil servants that were regarded to be disloyal to the junta. This contributed to 
the dismantling of the Central Service of the Ministry of Economics, which was responsible 
for controlling the function of tax bureaus. Under such conditions, it seems that during the 
dictatorship the tax system not only kept on posing difficulties to business and therefore to 
industry too, but also entered a phase of very rapid deterioration in the quality of its 
administrative structures. 
Indeed, as Zolotas noted in 1975, the dictatorship left public organisations and the broader 
public administration in a state of ‘generalised disruption’.71 Adding to this point, in an 
article originally written in 1995, Photopoulos noted that the dismantling of the Central 
Service of the Ministry of Economics by the dictatorial government ‘was a severe blow to the 
creation of executives of high scientific standards; its results became obvious several years 
later, with the decline in the quality of the tax bills that were proposed in the Parliament and 
of the interpretative statements issued [by the Ministry of Economics] in cases of 
controversial [tax] matters.’72 Confirming Photopoulos’ point in a more general sense, 
Kazakos noted that the people the junta appointed as executives in the various ministries 
were ‘distinctively uneducated.’73  
After the fall of the junta, the problems with the functioning of the tax mechanisms worsened. 
The impact of the dismissals of officers during the period of dictatorship kept burdening the 
tax administration, which also had to deal with a significant increase in the tax legislation’s 
frequency of change. Also, as relevant studies have indicated, there was an increase in the tax 
burden after the fall of the coup regime.74 The new pieces of legislation that the post-
dictatorial government introduced resulted in the imposition of new taxes or the increase of 
the burden of the already existing ones. These were legislative order 84/1974 as well as laws 
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231/1975 and 254/1976 introducing new taxes, law 12/1975 regarding the increase of already 
existing taxes, and law 11/1975 regarding property taxation.75 In this climate, in summer 
1977 and during the sixth Congress of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Greece the 
leader of the main opposition party in the Parliament, Georgios Mavros, noted that in order to 
take advantage of its association with the EEC, Greece needed an environment conducive to 
development. For this, the state needed to implement ‘clear policies’, as what long-term 
business planning needed was ‘a climate of trust and stability’. Yet, ‘the frequent changes of 
the tax legislation and other surprise alterations and contradictory policies’ were serious 
disincentives for the country’s economic development.76 In the same vein, the annual activity 
report for 1979 of the Union of Corporations and Limited Liability Companies mentioned 
that for the advancement of private investment, political, economic and financial stability, but 
also tax stability and consistency were needed. However, it stressed that such conditions were 
not met in the case of Greece and that the tax system was anything but stable: there were only 
‘continuous changes’ in it, which, combined with the various special contributions and other 
taxes, created a picture of ‘striking tax instability, prohibitive of investment activities’.77 
On the other hand, the constant imposition of new taxes (and the resultant increased 
complexity of the system) were part of the government’s efforts to sustain the increased 
expenditure of the budget, as they were accompanied by policies that clearly aimed to 
increase tax revenues such as the increase in the taxation of dividends, the imposition of 
capital gains taxation upon real estate owned by firms, the increase of turnover tax and the 
acceleration of the procedures governing the assessment and collection of excise duties.78  
The situation did not change with Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981. Maybe this was 
because, as it has been argued, the country’s authorities had seen the procedure of the 
accession to the EEC as a predominantly political matter. That is, they did not pay sufficient 
attention to the economic repercussions of it and did not place the economy to the centre of 
the negotiations preceding the accession, something that would have probably led to the 
beginning of an effort of restructuring of it.79 According to Zacharias Demathas, when 
Greece entered the European Union, it was accompanied by the problems of the 1970s, and 
specifically, high inflation, an economy controlled by the state, but also ‘deficient 
infrastructure, mechanisms and institutions’.80  
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Indeed, the problem of the complexity of tax legislation affected also the Value Added Tax, 
which was introduced in 1987, as a result of the country’s participation to the EEC. For 
instance, a newspaper article in early March 1988 noted that there were various complaints 
regarding the VAT return for the fiscal year 1987. The relevant form that had to be submitted 
was characterised as a ‘labyrinth’. This complexity became worse due to the fact that the 
circular that the Ministry of Economics had sent to the tax offices, offering instructions for 
the form’s completion, contained as many as 79 pages. ‘One should imagine’, noted the 
article, ‘the trouble and the...time that owners of business...will take in order to study the 
instructions and complete the return...while the Ministry speaks of simplification of 
procedures’.81 
 
The role of the tax authorities 
The arbitrary way with which the tax authorities functioned and the role of the tax officers 
during audits was an additional problem, one that was even more irritating than that of the 
complexity of legislation. This is what an examination of the complaints raised by 
entrepreneurs suggests. Such complaints ultimately questioned the tax officers’ ability to 
adequately perform their duties: ‘The directors of the tax offices, being, in their majority, 
ignorant of accounting, increase the profits of [the audited books], totally arbitrarily and 
unjustifiably’, argued one of the entrepreneurs’ representatives in 1957.82 
The way that tax officers appeared to behave during audits was often described to be 
unnecessarily aggressive. Significantly, this was acknowledged by members of the 
government. For example, according to a 1959 study entitled ‘Measures against tax theft’,83 
the legislative order 3848/1958 on business income taxation set that the audit reports leading 
to the rejection of accounting books would be examined by Advisory Committees.84 It was 
noted, however, that such committees’ decisions almost always coincided with the audit 
reports that rejected the books. Apart from this, the reports that the committees issued were 
lengthy and ‘written in a pointlessly adversarial spirit’. It was stressed in this study that this 
had to change and that strict measures such as the rejection of accounting books should be 
avoided: 
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A timely intervention is needed before honest taxpayers… become very upset and start 
resorting to acts of tax fraud or non-keeping of accounting books. The auditors and the 
members of the Advisory Committees have to understand that rejection of the 
accounting books...is an event that causes great suffering to the taxpayers, and should 
take place in totally extraordinary cases.85 
There was not any clarification with regards to what those extraordinary cases might be, but 
it seems that the reference was to cases in which the mistakes and/or omissions in the 
accounting books indicated tax evasion. Also, from the wording of the study, it seems that the 
problem with such advisory committees was that they did not seem to serve the role they had 
been created for: to check and control the tax auditors. Instead, for the most part, their 
decisions were in accordance to those of the tax auditors and they did not act as a check or 
balance. 
Tax officers’ arbitrariness was an issue that was openly discussed by entrepreneurs too. For 
instance, in the 1957 congress of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Greece the 
president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Epirus noted that the tax system 
allowed for compromises to take place between taxpayers and tax officers. Such 
compromises were achieved after the two parties negotiated with regards to the tax that 
would have to be paid. Of course, the very fact that such negotiations did take place increased 
the degree of arbitrariness of the tax system in general, and, more specifically, the 
arbitrariness in the behaviour of the tax officers. Even worse, such negotiations and 
compromises were deemed necessary by the taxpayers, it was noted, because taking legal 
actions would prove useless. In more detail, in the president’s words, any taxpayer in such an 
occasion would think of the following way:  
If I take legal actions, would it ever be possible for me to expect any further gain, 
especially from a second-degree court that is chaired by a...[Judge] who has no 
knowledge of such matters and an Economic Inspector who is undoubtedly a 
mouthpiece, if not an extension, of the inclinations and the aims of the Tax Officer?86 
Some characterised the whole process of negotiations and compromises with the tax 
authorities a ‘torture’ (Ta Nea, 20 October 1962) and relevant references appeared in 
politicians’ speeches too:  
Even for the slightest reason, the accounting books of merchants and industrialists get 
rejected..., and instead of a tax of, say, DRS 10,000, the tax auditor, through the 
rejection of the books, imposes a flat tax of DRS 100,000, and then asks the owner of 
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the industry to compromise…The reduction of any kind of tax rates has no effect when, 
through another door, that of classifying the tax payer to a higher tax bracket than the 
one he really belongs, the State oppresses the taxpayer and exercises over-taxation 
(Eleftheria, 3 August 1962). 
Problematic relations with the tax officers also led to the non-fulfilment of legislation, such 
as for example tax incentives that had been introduced for the promotion of investment. 
Indeed, in the fifth Congress of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Greece, the 
President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Heraclion, referring to three tax 
incentives laws aiming particularly to the development of regional industries (legislative 
orders 942/1949, 2176/1952 and law 321/1955), stressed that ‘the benefits stemming from the 
incentives laws should be of a permanent nature, without being subject to cancellation and 
without depending on the judgment of tax auditors with regards to the sincerity  of the 
regional industries’ accounting books’.87  
The Chamber also complained for the tax authorities’ ‘over-zealousness’ when collecting tax 
revenues, mentioning that there had often been instances of inaccurate tax assessments ‘that 
led firms to great troubles, or even to extinction’.88 In fact, there were indeed measures that 
indirectly promoted such over-zealousness, by relating, for example, the compensation of 
directors of tax offices with the level of tax revenues that they would achieve.89  
There were also cases in which the arbitrariness of the tax system stemmed not from the 
behaviour of individual officers, but from the general philosophy with which the tax 
legislation, the tax services, but also the Ministry of Economics functioned. For example, in a 
Board Meeting in the Union of Corporations and Limited Liability Companies in 1975, it was 
mentioned that if a firm disagreed with the tax authorities’ decision about the tax that had to 
be paid and appealed to the courts, it was obliged to pay the full amount of tax due in a single 
payment. On the contrary, if it compromised with the tax authorities, it could pay it in 8 
instalments. For the Union, such legislation indirectly forced firms to accept an ‘onerous 
compromise’.90 
In the same meeting, the vice-president of the Union noted that the tax services ranked firms 
in various classes and ‘decided in advance how much more tax each one should be paying’.91  
What he meant with such a comment was that, regardless of the information contained in 
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companies’ accounting books, tax audits would always result in such companies paying more 
taxes than those that would normally correspond to the economic results they declared. 
Apart from the role of the tax authorities during audits, entrepreneurs complained also about 
policies of a more general character that the Ministry of Economics implemented in order to 
tackle tax evasion. For example, whereas, in July 1982, the Ministry had declared that the 
names of tax evaders would be publicised only after the relevant courts issued their final 
judgments (I Kathimerini, 23 July 1982) the opposite tactic was followed in later years.  
In October 1988 the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Athens characterised the 
Ministry’s announcements with regards to transgressions of the tax legislation by banks, oil 
companies and commercial and industrial enterprises, as  ‘unacceptable defamations’, 
attempts to influence the judicial authorities and actions that were besetting the business and 
investment climate. The president of the Chamber Andreas Kyriazis noted that the cases of 
companies that had been found guilty of tax evasion by the relevant courts were ‘socially 
unacceptable and economically condemnable’. Yet, the cases that had recently come to light, 
he stressed, involved companies that were merely having differences with the tax authorities, 
mainly because of different interpretations of the tax laws.92 
On the same issue, it was noted in the Bulletin of the FGI in November 1988, that even 
before the relative cases were examined in courts, the state publicised the names of 
companies the taxable income of which was set higher than the one they had declared in their 
tax returns. This led to those companies’ ‘public vilification’, and harmed both the relations 
between taxpayers and the authorities and the business climate.’93 
Corruption 
What also harmed relations between taxpayers and the authorities were the cases of 
corruption that often appeared in the media, usually involving members of the tax services 
asking for bribes. In the study ‘Measures against tax theft’ mentioned previously, it was 
noted that control of the works of the tax services was ‘shadowy and in most cases non-
existent’, and that therefore, the establishment of inspection agencies of the various tax 
offices was necessary.94 It seems that the use of extortionary tactics by tax officers during 
audits were not a rare occasion. For example, cases such as the one of two tax officers who 
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were brought into custody with the accusation of blackmailing a factory owner ‘in order to 
extort DRS 6,000 from him...through the issuing of a favourable audit report’(Ta Nea, 27 April 
1956) made appearances in the press. In newspaper articles, sometimes tax officers were 
described as people that had the ability to ‘burn’ the taxpayer:  
[The tax collector] is the one who assesses [the taxpayer’s] profits, audits his books and 
estimates how much he has to pay. If he wants to, he can make an estimation of 10 
million. If he wants to, he makes one of 1 million. If he wants he accepts the accounting 
books, if [not] he rejects them. Therefore, the easiest thing for him is to blackmail the 
taxpayer (Ta Nea, 12 February 1955). 
Throughout the period analysed in this paper, there were many references in the press about 
incidents where tax officers were arrested for blackmailing and bribery. In most of the cases  
tax officers were accused of asking owners of companies for a bribe in order to not examine 
the company’s accounting books, or to reduce (or not impose at all) the fines that had to be 
paid because of mistakes found in such books.95 It was common in the cases referred to here 
that they came to light after the owners of the blackmailed companies filed reports to the 
police. Of course, it should certainly be expected that, in general, there would also be 
business owners - or taxpayers, more broadly - who would prefer to pay bribes, encouraging 
thus corruption and contributing to the problem of tax evasion. Still, that there were also 
people who preferred to complain to the police indicates that tax officers’ corruption was a 
real issue that harmed business; if this was not so, every owner of a blackmailed company 
would simply pay the bribe, without making any kind of complaint to the authorities. This 
was not the case, however. On the contrary, the situation with corrupt tax officers created an 
adverse climate, indicative of which is the following point made by the pre-mentioned 
entrepreneur Stelios Argyros:  
It would help if the tax system was stable and structured in such a way that the taxpayer 
did not come into contact with the tax officers. For example, in the US, tax audits take 
place on a random basis, and therefore the entrepreneur does not work thinking that 
‘tax officers will be coming every month and blackmail me’. He also knows however 
that if he is found to have gone against the law in one of these random checks, he will 
end up in prison. Because of this, he complies with tax legislation.96 
Moreover, there were laws that had been introduced in order to curb tax evasion and tax 
officers’ corruption, which, however, most of the time, also increased tax officers’ authority 
and thus, their potential arbitrariness. For example, in January 1978, the formation of special 
tax inspection teams was announced, in order to contribute to the fight against tax evasion. 
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These teams of tax officers were characterised by the front pages of the press of the period as 
‘commando-like’ groups97 that would have the authority to act as the police, carrying out 
surprise inspections on professionals’ and companies’ accounting books and records, on a 24-
hour basis. Amongst the groups’ responsibilities would be to daily inform the Ministry of 
Economics about their findings. The Ministry could then publicise the names of tax law 
offenders in cases of severe offences. More importantly, the inspection teams would have the 
authority to reject accounting books on a ‘fast-track’ basis and then determine taxable income 
ad-hoc, that is, disregarding any information about revenue and expenditure contained in the 
accounting books (Ta Nea, 26 January 1978). In this context, some noted that tax evasion was 
used as a pretext by the government, which formed such inspection groups in order to start 
‘hunting for taxes’ (Rizospastis, 26 January 1978). 
The draft bill containing such measures was entitled ‘On the assumption of measures against 
tax evasion and other relevant provisions’ and got publicised by the government in 23 August 
1978. Amongst its other provisions, the bill also announced the formation of the body of 
Sworn-in Valuers, having as its main purpose the valuation of property for taxation related 
matters. In a parliamentary discussion, Athanasios Krikos, an MP of the ruling party New 
Democracy, noted that the Body would protect the taxpayers from the tax officers’ 
arbitrariness, who, ‘in order to ingratiate themselves with their superiors, very often 
impose[d] higher taxes than they should’ (I Kathimerini, 18 May 1979). Still, the general 
appreciation of the press was that the bill provided tax officers with ‘excessive powers’ (To 
Vima, 24 August 1978) and aimed to intimidate taxpayers introducing ‘unprecedented 
penalties and fines’ (ibid.). More specifically, and apart from the measures mentioned above, 
the establishment of services for the control of the movement of goods was decided, in which 
tax officers would have the authority to undertake investigating tasks even without a relevant 
order from a Prosecutor. The inspectors of the tax services would also have the right to 
perform investigations in order to retrieve the taxpayers’ books and records, again even 
without a Prosecutor’s order, but also the authority to order the re-examination of any tax 
case (ibid.). 
For the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Athens, the bill provided Inspectors of tax 
offices with increased powers, introduced ‘crippling penalties’ and ‘handed the taxpayer over 
to the uncontrollable judgment of the directors of tax offices’.98 It is characteristic that at the 
time, the state itself openly acknowledged how rampant the problem of corruption was. 
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Indicatively, even the Secretary of State Konstantinos Stephanopoulos admitted, in a relevant 
Parliamentary discussion in 1981, that apart from bureaucracy, one of the main problems of 
the public sector was that there were many services in which bribing was a standard 
practice.99  In the same vein, a retired tax officer that participated in this research noted: 
At around 1980 the director of my department was talking about an officer who, with 
the things he did, earned a second salary. For example, he issued certificates; if you 
bribed him, he issued them faster. Or, in the department where they stamped (for 
authentication purposes) the accounting books and records, he wouldn’t stamp, say, 10 
invoice books, but only one, in order for you to have to come again [and bribe him]. 
This officer gave to the trade unionist of the ruling party his vote. And to this trade 
unionist he turned if he needed something, giving him of course, in return, some kind of 
‘gift’.100  
Indeed, numerous cases of tax officers being arrested for bribery appeared in the press 
throughout the period that is examined here.101  According to an article in the newspaper 
Rizospastis in September 1983, one such case led to the dismissal of two tax officers and the 
transfer of the director of the tax service to which they belonged. The person who revealed 
this specific case by complaining to the authorities was the owner of a handicraft industry, 
who also made the following statement: ‘Groups of tax officers that are in charge of 
performing audits...operate in an organised fashion and blackmail owners of handicraft 
industries and shop owners’. The same person also argued that every time there was an audit 
of accounting books, tax officers ‘created problems’ for shopkeepers, blackmailing them in 
order to gain bribes ‘in exchange for them keeping quiet’ (Rizospastis, 18 September 1983). 
 
Conclusion 
 
William Baumol’s research indicated that tax rules affect the development of 
entrepreneurship and influence the forms of it that can emerge in different societal and 
economic contexts. However, Baumol’s examination considered exclusively the level of 
taxes. This paper takes his perspective a step further, by suggesting that the explanatory 
power of his model can be enhanced by taking into consideration the importance of the tax 
regime as well, and examining how the way that the tax services function affects 
entrepreneurship. 
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The evidence presented here considers the interaction between the tax system and 
entrepreneurship in Greece from the mid 1950s to the late 1980s. The analysis suggests that 
for Greek entrepreneurship, the adverse effects of the system of taxation came mostly from a 
series of issues that increased its perceived unfairness and illegitimacy, such as the 
complexity and frequent changes of the tax laws and the arbitrariness of the tax authorities. 
Such problems had nothing to do with tax rates, which in fact were one of the very few 
features of the tax system that were certain and non-negotiable. 
Of course, it is true that the information presented here is not derived from case studies of 
individual companies but rather from publications of business bodies of Greece such as the 
Federation of Greek Industrialists and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Greece, 
and also speeches, interviews and articles written by these bodies’ representatives. The 
evidence also present politicians’ views, the views of the wider public, as well as the views of 
the representatives of institutions such as the Bank of Greece. Such a variety of sources 
reflects, on the one hand, the issue of availability:  it was difficult to obtain access to business 
archives containing information about a subject as thorny as the functioning of the tax 
system. The way that the tax system affected investment plans or any other aspect of business 
decision making was something that was not often discussed by Greek entrepreneurs, nor, 
rather, recorded in the relevant sources. To this could have contributed the fact that, as the 
bulk of evidence indicates, such discussions would most probably also contain references on 
tax evasion and / or corruption.   
However, apart from the scarcity of material, the variety of sources employed in this research 
also reflects the need to corroborate the views expressed by business. For example, the 
complaints with regards to the arbitrariness of tax officers were expressed not only by 
entrepreneurs, but by individual taxpayers and politicians too, and the critique about the 
obscurity of the tax procedures came also from tax professionals and other experts. The 
consistency of evidence presented suggests that the complaints and criticism were not simply 
part of an anti-tax rhetoric voiced by entrepreneurs and their representatives, but that they 
truly reflected the general public’s vexation caused due to the way the tax system functioned. 
Overall, it seems that Greek entrepreneurs considered that the way the tax system functioned 
was posing a systemic threat to their activities and increased uncertainty, which was anything 
but beneficial for investing in business. 
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Research based on the extended version of Baumol’s model that is suggested here could 
provide useful insights about the interaction between taxation and business, especially for the 
cases of countries like Greece, in which tax administration seems to be a greater obstacle for 
entrepreneurial activity than tax rates. Of course, it should be noted here that the present 
analysis implied a dichotomy between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. It is 
acknowledged however that, in the majority of the cases, as one of the reviewers of this 
article suggested, practicing entrepreneurs are usually dividing their time between productive 
entrepreneurship and activities that, according to the Baumolian perspective, are examples of 
unproductive entrepreneurship, such as, for example, tax avoidance. In other words, future 
research should also take into consideration that in reality entrepreneurial effort involves 
almost always a trade-off between productive and unproductive activities. 
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